25

17 June 1959

Copy No. C 62

## CENTRAL

## INTELLIGENCE

## BULLETIN




<b>2</b>	
DOCUMENT NO.	200
NO CHANGE IN CLASS,	
1. DEGLASSIFIED	
CLAGS, CHANGED TO: TS S C.	
NEXT REVIEW DATE:	<b>)</b>
AUTH: AHF 79-2	
DATE REVIEWER:	

DIA	and	DOS	review(s	s) com	oleted.
<b>–</b> ., .	4114		10110111	o, oo	pioto ai

Approved For Release 223361/2 2 2 2 T00975A004500320001-6

2

**Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt** 



Iraq: With the 14 July parade still a month away, the arrival of contingents of artillery and armor on the outskirts of Baghdad will probably further increase Iraqi nationalists' expectations that Prime Minister Qasim is about to move decisively against the Communists. Several officials, including the commandant of the Staff College, have recently told Americans they believe that a crisis is impending. While continuing public Communist attacks on government policies, reports of Communist plotting to assassinate him, or widespread violence might cause Qasim to feel the need for direct action, his performance in recent weeks suggests that he would prefer to move cautiously and quietly to reduce Communist influence.

25X1

17 June 59

DAILY BRIEF

ii

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975 004500320001-6

25 🗶 1

25 💥

## IV. CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB COMMITTEE ON BERLIN SITUATION

The USIB has taken note of the following conclusions reached by its special committee on the Berlin situation. The committee pointed out that its conclusions were to be used in context with all SNIEs relevant to the Berlin situation.

- 1. So long as the USSR estimates that there are any prospects for a summit conference, it probably will not conclude a separate peace treaty with the GDR or turn over access controls to the East Germans. The USSR will continue to use threats of such action as a form of pressure on the West. The actual physical transfer of controls could be accomplished with little or no warning.
- 2. While there are no reliable indications of a bloc intent to deny Allied or West German access to West Berlin, or to seal off West Berlin in the immediate future, such action could be taken with little or no warning.
- 3. The information available to the Committee on the Geneva foreign ministers' conference and Communist public statements indicate the USSR is formally maintaining the position on Berlin taken by Gromyko on 10 June, but is denying that any ultimatum is involved. The Soviet Union is informally suggesting that it might agree to a period longer than one year for the termination of Allied occupation rights in Berlin but on

of the

17 June 59

DAILY BRIEF

iii

some new basis which would supersede existing agreements. It will refuse to give the Allies reaffirmation of their occupation rights in Berlin without setting a definite time limit.

- 4. The USSR may anticipate divisions among the Western Allies and a consequent weakening in the Western negotiating position as a result of (a) an increase in internal political pressures on the British Government to reach some accommodation with the USSR; (b) the present confusion in West German politics; and (c) the continued French obstructionism in NATO military planning as a result of French national policies.
- There has been no significant change in the economy of Berlin. Berliners will be extremely sensitive to the final decision on where the West German presidential elections are held--in West Berlin or in West Germany.
- 6. There have been no significant changes in Soviet capabilities to respond to possible Western actions in the event of turnover, harassment, or blockade.

25X1

25 💥